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Abstract 
Multicultural theory pays surprisingly little attention to the plurality of identity. In addition, 
there is still dissatisfaction with Will Kymlicka’s distinction between polyethnic groups and 
national minorities and the rights they deserve, as well as continued criticism of liberal 
multiculturalism more broadly. I revisit this distinction based on Amartya Sen’s recent effort 
to introduce the notion of identity pluralism into liberal debates. In Identity and Violence, Sen 
stresses the importance of maintaining political stability through individuals’ plural identities 
mainly in relation to religious divides and global conflict. Sen’s theory is criticised for being 
too abstract, but I interpret these abstract ideas to criticise Kymlicka’s distinction between 
polyethnic groups and national minorities and strengthen liberal multiculturalism. I argue that 
the notion of identity pluralism implies that a state must promote multicultural ‘participation 
rights’ for all minority identities, rather than ‘accommodation rights’ for polyethnic groups 
and ‘self-government rights’ for national minorities as Kymlicka contends. Consequently, 
regions like Quebec, Flanders and Catalonia would not merit the level of autonomy they 
currently enjoy, and Scotland should not be granted independence from the United Kingdom. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Multicultural theory pays surprisingly little attention to the plurality of identity. When 
multiculturalism debates sprang into life in the 1990s, postmodernists such as Foucault, 
Deleuze and Guattari had already portrayed the complexity of identity.
1
 However, the liberals 
who became dominant in multiculturalism largely neglected this complexity, and thus devised 
minority theories based on singular notions of identity along which individuals could be 
categorised into groups. While there is some literature about the formation of identity in 
modern plural democracies, the focus often remains on singular identity.
2
 Consequently, Will 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship, which influenced many subsequent multicultural 
theories by others and himself, is centred on the categorical distinction between polyethnic 
and national minority groups.
3
 Despite several attempts to (briefly) criticise this distinction,
4
 
the feel of the literature remains that it is problematic but not clearly illegitimate – and 
therefore Kymlicka’s theory has received less support than it could have.  
Considering this largely unarticulated dissatisfaction with Kymlicka’s distinction 
between polyethnic groups and national minorities and the rights they deserve, as well as 
continued criticism of liberal multiculturalism more broadly,
5
 I will revisit this distinction 
based on Amartya Sen’s recent effort to introduce the notion of identity pluralism into liberal 
debates. In Identity and Violence, Sen stresses the importance of maintaining political stability 
through individuals’ plural identities mainly in relation to religious divides and global 
conflict.
6
 Sen’s theory is criticised for being too abstract,7 but I will interpret these abstract 
                                                          
1
 For recent work on the complexity of identity, see W. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations 
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2
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Violence and the Need to Belong (Arcade Publishing, New York, 2001); I. Young, Inclusion and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
3
 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
4
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 Kymlicka describes recent dissatisfaction with liberal multiculturalism in W. Kymlicka, Multicultural 
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6
 A. Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2006). 
3 
 
ideas to criticise Kymlicka’s distinction between polyethnic groups and national minorities 
and strengthen liberal multiculturalism. I argue that the notion of identity pluralism implies 
that a state must promote multicultural ‘participation’ rights for all minority identities, rather 
than ‘accommodation rights’ for polyethnic groups and ‘self-government rights’ for national 
minorities as Kymlicka contends. This argument rests on a positive and a negative liberty. 
According to the positive liberty, an individual should be free to flourish in her different 
identities and might require liberal multicultural rights to do so. For example, if she wishes to 
flourish both as a Muslim and public school student, the state should exempt her from laws 
that prohibit headwear in schools. According to the related negative liberty, an individual 
should be free from a dominating group identity that obliterates her other identities. To 
mitigate the possible dominance of an identity, which might also lead to sharp divisions and 
antagonism between groups, the individual should receive liberal multicultural rights that 
allow her to transcend this identity and balance it more equally with her other identities.  
 Some scholars argue that Kymlicka’s theory only applies to Canada,8 even though in 
recent books he attempts to demonstrate its wider applicability.
9
 I am persuaded by 
Kymlicka’s main point: despite good intentions a liberal state cannot be neutral regarding 
language, schooling, holidays, etc. and should therefore rectify disadvantages this imposes on 
minorities.
10
 However, I hope to make his theory more appealing by obviating his 
troublesome distinction between polyethnic and self-government rights. A stronger liberal 
multiculturalism could provide better normative guidelines for public policy that could be 
applied in different context-specific ways around the world.  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7
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Democracy in Africa (James Currey, Oxford, 2004); W. Kymlicka and B. He (eds.), Multiculturalism in Asia 
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2 Polyethnic Rights 
 
I show how Sen’s identity pluralism and concern for political stability makes redundant 
Kymlicka’s differential treatment of polyethnic groups and national minorities, as this 
pluralism supports ‘polyethnic rights’ for both of Kymlicka’s groups. To do so, I first 
demonstrate how identity pluralism endorses these rights for polyethnic groups, and then how 
it refutes self-government rights for national minorities. According to Kymlicka, “polyethnic” 
(what he later calls “accommodation”11) rights “are intended to help ethnic groups and 
religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their 
success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society” and are “intended 
to promote integration into the larger society”.12 As identity pluralists want individuals to 
flourish in their plurality of identities and be free from domination by one identity, they would 
similarly advocate such ‘participation’ rights for polyethnic group members. By participating 
in society rather than only a subculture, individuals see more easily that they share identities 
across many categories. 
 Kymlicka easily grants polyethnic rights to immigrants, as he demonstrates that 
immigrants do not threaten democratic stability.
13
 Immigrants have fewer rights claims than 
national minorities, because they immigrated voluntarily and desire to participate in society 
anyway.
14
 However, to participate they seek to: 
renegotiate the terms of integration … Immigrants are demanding a more tolerant or 
‘multicultural’ approach to integration that would allow and support immigrants to maintain 
various aspects of their ethnic heritage even as they integrate into common institutions 
operating in the majority language … the institutions of the larger society should be adapted to 
provide greater recognition and accommodation of these ethnic identities—e.g. schools and 
other public institutions should accommodate their religious holidays, dress, dietary 
restrictions, and so on.
15
  
 
Unlike Kymlicka, Sen believes immigrants can threaten political stability if they become 
isolated. He writes, “[s]ince Britain is currently torn between interaction and isolation [of its 
subcultures], the distinction is centrally important (and has a bearing even on terrorism and 
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 W. Kymlicka, ‘Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Forst’, 
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idea that immigrants have few rights claims because they immigrated voluntarily, see also R. Bauböck, ‘Cultural 
Minority Rights for Immigrants’, 30:1 International Migration Review (Spring 1996) pp. 203250. 
15
 Kymlicka, supra note 13, p. 354, also p. 339; see also Kymlicka, supra note 3, pp. 1011, 178; Berman et al., 
supra note 9, p. 60. 
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violence)”.16 He cautions against the expansion of state-sponsored religious schools in Britain, 
which instil singular identities in children before they have even learned to reason about 
identity themselves, and could foster home-grown terrorism. In Northern Ireland, such 
religious identity division caused violence, which he warns Britain could eventually 
experience as well.
17
 State-funding of religious schools is multicultural policy, but isolating 
rather than participatory. Instead, Sen wants children to attend common schools that are more 
identity-neutral and encourage children to explore and prioritise their diverse identities in an 
environment of diverse backgrounds.
18
 However, I contend that this implies a need for 
participatory polyethnic rights, for example in allowing religious symbols in school. After all, 
religion may be an identity in which children wish to flourish, and parents of religious 
children might not allow them to attend public school otherwise. 
 More generally, polyethnic participation rights are supported by Sen’s idea that every 
individual has multiple identities in which she could flourish. He specifies that even supposed 
holistic identities like religion need not confine these other identities. A “Muslim has much 
freedom to determine what other values and priorities he or she would choose without 
compromising a basic Islamic faith”.19 Kwame Appiah notes that this merely proves that there 
are debates internal to belief systems about their practices rather than that beliefs cannot be 
comprehensive.
20
 However, by giving this Muslim participatory rights, she could partake in 
social and professional activities in which her identity might be more determined by these 
activities than her religion. The issue is that she can identify as a salesperson, mother, 
volleyball player and British-Pakistani, but that if she works in a Muslim shop, raises her 
child in a Muslim family, plays volleyball in a Muslim sports association and associates with 
other Muslims rather than other Pakistani and British people, Islam would likely dominate her 
identity at the expense of the others. Sen acknowledges that individuals prioritise identities, 
but wants to avoid people perceiving their identities as merely singular. Thus, I argue that 
participation policies allow this person to mitigate her overarching identity somewhat in 
favour of others. Making it easier for this Muslim to work in a non-Muslim shop, attend baby 
classes with other non-Muslim mothers, play volleyball in a non-Muslim sports association 
and interact more with non-Muslim Pakistanis and Britons allows her to flourish broadly and 
associate more with these other identity groups. In addition to being Muslim, she could 
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 Sen, supra note 6, p. 156. 
17
 Ibid., pp. 113, 118119, 160, 164. 
18
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identify more easily as a ‘salesperson’, ‘mother’, etc. – rather than as a ‘Muslim salesperson’, 
‘Muslim mother’, etc.  
In addition to enhancing an individual’s awareness of her different identities, such 
participation fosters personal relations across dominant identity groups. A mere abstract 
awareness of sharing a profession, gender, religion or nationality with others does not provide 
a strong antidote to (violent) exploitation of singular identities by group leaders. However, if 
the individual interacts with others in these shared identity groups, she is less likely to 
suddenly see these groups as antagonistic ‘others’. While the possibility still exists, it is 
mitigated. Sen indicates that in categorising groups we often forget about “the reach and 
influence of interactions” across borders.21 He refers to global exchanges of information and 
goods, but it equally applies to national situations and people through whom interactions take 
place. More particularly, he indicates: “the translation of that [singularisation] vision into 
actual application has often taken the form of neglecting the relevance of the person’s plural 
social relations”.22 This comment suggests that relations already exist, but we need to be more 
aware of them. However, increasing isolation based on singular identities reduces relations 
between members of different groups. Looking forward, Sen concludes: “the future of 
multiethnic Britain must lie in recognising, supporting, and helping to advance the many 
different ways in which citizens with distinct politics, linguistic heritage, and social priorities 
(along with different ethnicities and religions) can interact with each other in their different 
capacities, including as citizens”.23 This “supporting” and “helping to advance” endorses the 
idea of granting immigrants participation rights, which allow them to thrive in their plural 
identities within society and forge relationships with those who share these particular 
identities. 
Thus, identity pluralism supports polyethnic rights similar to those Kymlicka 
advocates. These often merely affirm rights that immigrants already have as citizens, but 
cannot utilise properly in a state-neutral situation. In particular, as Sen wants an individual to 
transcend what many multiculturalists claim is necessarily her dominant identity, he would 
endorse exemption laws that Kymlicka indicates are contested. Kymlicka writes:  
Perhaps the most controversial demand of ethnic groups is for exemptions from laws and 
regulations that disadvantage them, given their religious practices. For example, Jews and 
Muslims in Britain have sought exemption from Sunday closing or animal slaughtering 
legislation; Sikh men in Canada have sought exemption from motorcycle helmet laws and 
from the official dress-codes of police forces, so that they can wear their turban; Orthodox 
Jews in the United States have sought the right to wear the yarmulke during military service; 
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 Sen, supra note 6, p. 11, also p. 12. 
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 Ibid., p. 177, also p. xiv. 
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and Muslim girls in France have sought exemption from school dresscodes so that they can 
wear the chador.
24
 
 
It is these exemption laws that allow individuals to participate in professional and social 
identities outside their narrow ethnically- or religiously-defined communities, and create 
relations with others in society.  
 Critics may object that states implement participation rights merely to assimilate 
minorities. However, the whole point of these rights – especially legal exemptions – is to 
allow minorities to participate through their cultural characteristics instead of those of the 
dominant majority.
25
 Moreover, Sen argues that cultural contacts have dissolved distinct 
national cultures that immigrants could be required to assimilate to, and that traditional 
cultures are also obligated to adapt to their pluralising identity.
26
 Consequently, both Sen and 
Kymlicka refer to such multiculturalism as “hybridising”,27 as different cultural identities mix 
and create new ones, and “[m]embers of one ethnic group will meet and befriend members of 
other groups, and adopt new identities and practices”.28 Multiculturalism through 
participatory polyethnic rights therefore leads to Sen’s desired society of plural interrelated 
identities, rather than homogenous or isolated identities. 
 Thus, Kymlicka argues that immigrants have few rights claims to conserve their 
culture, because they immigrated voluntarily and desire participatory rather than isolationist 
rights. However, with his example of increasingly segregated religious schooling in England, 
Sen shows that such groups sometimes do demand isolationist rights that could divide citizens 
into singularised identities and threaten political stability. Consequently, identity pluralists 
contend that immigrants should be forced to accept participatory rights that reduce 
singularisation of identity and allow them to flourish freely in their plural identities. 
Kymlicka’s polyethnic rights are thus supported by identity pluralism, but in the next section I 
show that that this support does not extend to self-government rights. Rather, national 
minorities should also receive participation rights, which makes Kymlicka’s problematic 
distinction between polyethnic groups and national minorities redundant and his liberal 
multicultural theory more appealing. 
  
                                                          
24
 Kymlicka, supra note 3, p. 31, also pp. 9697, 177, and for a more elaborate discussion: pp. 114115. 
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3 National Minority Rights 
 
Having shown that immigrants need polyethnic rights, I now use identity pluralism to 
demonstrate that national minorities should also receive such participation rather than self-
government rights as Kymlicka advocates. Kymlicka distinguishes polyethnic groups from 
national minorities “that formed complete and functioning societies in their historic homeland 
prior to being incorporated into a larger state”.29 These minorities consist of “indigenous 
peoples” and “substate nations”, such as “Catalans, Basques, Flemish, Scots, Welsh, 
Corsicans, Puerto Ricans, and Quebecois”.30 They generally want to remain “distinct societies 
alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government 
[through secession or federalism] to ensure their survival as distinct societies”.31 More 
particularly, they desire “their own schools, courts, media, political institutions, and so on”.32 
Kymlicka indicates that empirically it has proven difficult to integrate national minorities and 
is worse for political stability than granting them certain autonomy rights.
33
 However, he 
admits that national minority claims threaten stability more than immigrant claims.
34
 Overall, 
Kymlicka advises scrutiny of particular national minority rights claims, but makes a strong 
case for granting such rights under certain circumstances. Identity pluralism, however, 
suggests that such rights worsen the problem of dominating singular (cultural) identities and 
should be rejected. Instead, the state should offer national minorities participation rights, 
which allow them to maintain many of their cultural practices while engaging with society.  
 Identity pluralists’ main objection to Kymlicka’s national minority rights is that self-
government based on a singular cultural identity conflicts with the idea that individuals have 
multiple identities which they should be able to prioritise themselves. Sen warns against 
seeing people as part of only one group. He writes, “incitement to ignore all affiliation and 
loyalties other than those emanating from one restrictive identity can be deeply delusive and 
also contribute to social tension and violence”,35 and “multiculturalism cannot override the 
right of a person to participate in civil society, or to take part in national politics, or to lead a 
                                                          
29
 Kymlicka, supra note 13, p. 349, more generally see pp. 330, 344345, 350352, 368; Kymlicka, supra note 
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35
 Sen, supra note 6, p. 21. 
9 
 
socially nonconformist life … no matter how important multiculturalism is, it cannot lead 
automatically to giving priority to the dictates of traditional culture over all else”.36 Identity 
pluralists are thus sceptical of granting groups autonomy that – even if it does not cause 
internal restrictions – will likely narrow the identity understanding of their members to the 
group rather than society. 
To elaborate, identity pluralists problematise the exacerbation of singular identities 
through self-government for three reasons. First, the focus on minority culture largely 
obliterates the group’s internal differences, and its members’ relations with other groups –
which Sen stresses repeatedly.
37
 Moreover, Sen shows that the illusion of a “Hindu 
civilization” has stirred Hindu activism in India that turns against internal and external 
others.
38
 National minorities are smaller than supposed civilisations, but similar 
homogenisation and isolation could result from making them authoritative identity groups. 
Kymlicka might respond that because national minorities are small and geographically 
concentrated, they contain fewer internal differences than the cultures Sen addresses. 
However, in the age of globalisation, even regions like Quebec and Catalonia contain non-
group members and members whose substate identity is unimportant to them relative to 
identities they share across cultural groups. Kymlicka argues that once a region is 
autonomous, it depends on the local democracy and “cultural market-place” for its inhabitants 
to decide about culture.
39
 However, these non-group members and group members who do not 
desire local cultural laws then constitute a minority. The state could enforce special individual 
rights to protect this minority within the minority, but that causes a downward spiral of 
special rights. Moreover, it begs the question whether national minority members should just 
receive individual rather than self-government rights – a point I return to below. Finally, we 
should not underestimate the extent to which a minority with self-government can 
homogenise its members and singularise their identities. Kymlicka opposes internal 
restrictions, but admits self-government could provide a slippery slope toward such 
restrictions.
40
 Even if it does not enforce restrictions, it may (unintentionally) enforce cultural 
                                                          
36
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Recognition  (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994) pp. 152; Patricia Limerick, ‘The Startling Ability of 
Culture to Bring Critical Inquiry to a Halt’, in L. Crothers and C. Lockhart (eds.), Culture and Politics: A Reader 
(St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000) p. 74. 
38
 Sen, supra note 6, pp. 178179. 
39
 Kymlicka, supra note 3, p. 113. 
40
 Ibid., p. 38. 
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conformism. Kymlicka describes that “Indian tribes/bands have been acquiring increasing 
control over health, education, family law, policing, criminal justice, and resource 
development”,41 and Quebec “has extensive jurisdiction over issues that are crucial to the 
survival of the French culture, including control over education, language, culture, as well as 
significant input into immigration policy”.42 These significant powers could be used to 
promote group identity at the cost of members’ other identities. If self-government leads to 
independence, which Kymlicka indicates is often intended,
43
 this singularisation of identity is 
exacerbated. Towards the end of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka admits that:  
 
[i]t seems unlikely that according self-government rights to a national minority can serve an integrative 
function. If citizenship is membership in a political community, then, in creating overlapping political 
communities, self-government rights necessarily give rise to a sort of dual citizenship, and to potential 
conflicts about which community citizens identify with most deeply.
44
  
 
That does not even consider the non-community identities citizens have. Ultimately, identity 
pluralists cannot accept disregard for differences within, and relations between, cultural 
groups.  
 Second, even if we accept that one identity precedes others, as Tony Gallagher 
indicates in a review of Sen,
45
 there is no reason it should be national minority identity. Sen 
admits that people value culture and that social context limits their choices. However, he 
argues that they should be free to choose what importance to attach to culture.
46
 He writes, 
“important as culture is, it is not uniquely significant in determining our lives and identities. 
Other things, such as class, race, gender, profession, politics, also matter, and can matter 
powerfully.”47 Consequently, feminists and socialists can object to Kymlicka that gender or 
class precedes cultural identity, but even they might then be prone to claim falsely that such 
precedence is universal rather than dependent on the individual as identity pluralists believe. 
Sen continues: “[M]ust a person’s relation to Britain be mediated through the ‘culture’ of the 
family in which he or she has been born? A person may decide to seek closeness with more 
than one of these pre-defined cultures or, just as plausibly, with none.”48 Again, Sen focuses 
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on intermingled religious groups. However, his point, that it is not evident or desirable that 
cultural leaders should mediate between group members and society, applies similarly to 
national minorities. If a female Catalan teacher wants gender and education issues addressed 
at the state level, a self-governing Catalonia might inhibit this identification and action. After 
all, local autonomy usually equates to less political power at the state level for minorities. 
Even when they retain such power, it is unlikely to be used for the common good or other 
shared identity groups once local culture has such an authoritative influence on identity. 
Kymlicka might argue that the reason for preferring national minority identity over others is 
that it encompasses a “societal culture” consisting of different identity aspects, such as 
language, religion, culture, etc., which together provide a context in which minority members 
can use effectively their freedoms.
49
 This argument is fair, but from the perspective of 
promoting (an awareness of) identity pluralism it remains problematic to institutionally 
endorse one identity over others. It hinders individuals’ participation in the greater ‘societal 
culture’ of the state and their other identities within it. 
 Third, cultural identities change. Many scholars indicate that cultures evolve,
50
 but 
identity pluralists add that identities and their prioritisation also change. Therefore, we should 
not create institutions that lock cultural identities into place, but individual cultural rights that 
group members can choose to exercise. Sen elaborates: “Any presumption of stationariness … 
can be disastrously deceptive. The temptation toward using cultural determinism often takes 
the hopeless form of trying to moor the cultural anchor on a rapidly moving boat.”51 
Furthermore, his statement that “[c]ulture cannot be seen as an isolated force independent of 
other influences” suggests that national minorities are not culturally separated, which makes 
self-government more controversial.
52
 Kymlicka admits cultures change, but uses this as an 
argument to “distinguish the existence of a culture from its ‘character’ at any given 
moment”.53 He even states that “to maintain a separate societal culture in a modern state is a 
very ambitious and arduous project” and that many Asians believe that minority nationalism 
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will “disappear over time as a result of modernisation and development”.54 However, he 
concludes that autonomy rights are unreasonable only for immigrants, not for national 
minorities. Identity pluralists disagree – these rights are unreasonable for all minorities. 
 An indirect reason that identity pluralists reject self-government is economic 
opportunity and inequality. Sen warns that poverty allows instigators of violence to rally 
people around singular identities. Consequently, to make individuals aware of their 
overlapping identities, we must alleviate poverty through greater social equity.
55
 Sen argues 
that the “challenges today include the possibility of making good use of the remarkable 
benefits of economic connections, technological progress, and political opportunity in a way 
that pays adequate attention to the interests of the deprived and the underdog”.56 In fostering 
identity pluralism, Sen references the mixed city of Kolkata: “In the recognition of plural 
human identities, the increased concentration on class and other sources of economic disparity 
has made it very hard to excite communal passions and violence in Kolkata along the 
religious divide.”57 Except for relatively wealthy substates like Catalonia, many indigenous 
and substate groups are poorer than their surrounding society. Autonomy might widen this 
economic disparity and lead to identity singularisation and violence. Minority self-
government might hurt its members’ economic well-being in two ways. First, the federalist 
structure created for local self-government means a decreasing role of the state and probably 
of central redistribution of wealth.
58
 Even if minorities institute social redistribution within 
their territory, they will thus remain poor compared with the surrounding society. Second, 
self-government policies that create disconnections with society hurt its members’ economic 
opportunities. For example, mandating minority language in schools hinders members’ ability 
to work in the wider society – Quebecers educated in French struggle more to find work in the 
rest of English-speaking Canada than if they had been taught in English.  
In addition, divergent language and cultural policies between minority and majority 
governments can alienate these groups and decrease the solidarity that many scholars argue a 
redistributive welfare state needs.
59
 Conversely, critics could argue that self-government 
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ensures that minority members are treated fairly and receive more resource benefits than they 
would under a dominant majority culture. But unless the minority group already possesses 
wealth or resources, the net effect of self-government might likely still be negative. Kymlicka 
indicates that Marxists and many liberals argue that reducing economic inequalities 
automatically reduces cultural inequalities. However, he contends that this does not always 
apply (though it often helps) as evidenced by Japanese- and Arab-Americans, and Quebecers 
and Catalans – and that states need more evidence about the relation between economic and 
cultural inequality. He concludes that cultural rights are still important and can often coincide 
with economic rights.
60
 Nonetheless, he still focuses on the status of current dominant 
identities, whereas identity pluralists advocate economic equality so individuals are freer to 
choose and prioritise their identities. Ultimately, the economic issue is minor in Western 
countries. But it may be an important consideration in granting national minority autonomy in 
poorer countries in Africa and elsewhere, where increased economic inequalities might 
exacerbate singular identities and conflict.  
 Having established that identity pluralism contradicts self-government rights, I 
describe multicultural policies for national minorities consistent with Sen’s reasoning. Identity 
pluralism does not reject multicultural rights for national minorities, but endorses 
participation rather than autonomy rights. Self-government rights largely dictate individuals’ 
identity priority and might cause internal group homogenisation pressure and alienation from 
other groups and society. Individual participation rights such as those for immigrants, 
however, give individuals more choice to prioritise and balance their identities. By allowing 
members of national minorities to participate more in society and central democracy, they 
may develop their different identities and the social connections these provide. Consequently, 
in The Idea of Justice, Sen concludes that “[t]he practice of democracy can certainly assist in 
bringing out a greater recognition of the plural identities of human beings”.61 He continues 
that institutions alone cannot prevent violence between singularised identity groups, but that 
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“the bonds established by national democracies serve as an effective safeguard against this”.62 
However, to allow national minorities to participate effectively in society and the democratic 
process, they might need the participatory multicultural rights I described in the previous 
section.  
Sometimes these polyethnic rights might lead to similar results as self-government, so 
national minorities need not fully compromise their position. For example, members of 
substate nations could receive bilingual options within institutions, so they can work partly in 
their language and their children can use this language in schools. The difference is that group 
members must also master the state language. Local government cannot force its members to 
learn the substate language (as Quebec does for children of French-speaking parents), so the 
linguistic and identity divide between the national minority and the rest of society will not be 
as sharp and prone to instability. Examples of such bilingual rights for national minorities 
already exist and are thus not so far-fetched, as Kymlicka describes that “[i]n Guam and 
Hawaii, the indigenous language (Chamorro and Hawaiian) has equal status with English in 
schools, courts, and other dealings with government”.63 Critics might argue that language is 
so important to flourishing within a cultural identity that even a compromise of bilingual 
schooling and institutions hurts minority members’ cultural identity. However, this 
importance and exclusiveness of language is exactly why it is prone to singularise identities 
along sharp linguistic divides. Identity pluralists want individuals to identify more with the 
different professional and social groups they share across society, which would be severely 
limited if they cannot communicate with other members of these non-cultural identities. 
Nevertheless, language remains perhaps the most important issue for many national minorities 
and should be considered carefully in particular decisions about multicultural rights. 
  Besides this language issue, critics could make several objections to granting national 
minorities participation rather than self-government rights. It is beyond the scope of this essay 
to address all these properly, but I briefly consider three main ones. First, critics may object 
that individuals can also have multiple identities within an autonomous region rather than the 
larger society. Second, they could argue that preventing internal community conformism and 
intercommunity violence leads to even more destructive state nationalism.
64
 Third, they might 
contend that it is impossible to circumvent group antagonism by promoting larger over 
smaller political units, as the binary nature of identities requires ‘others’. These objections are 
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fair, but unpersuasive. Namely, identity pluralists do not deny that individuals can be aware of 
plural identities within an autonomous region and that elevating state identity could lead to 
antagonistic state nationalism. But they precisely want to promote awareness of plural 
identities within national minorities, and prevent a need to create social unity through state 
nationalism, by institutionally enhancing individuals’ different identities and the social unity 
these create through a network of social connections. By creating a social system that relies 
on a network of bonds of culture, profession, gender, age, etc., there is less need to create 
social unity through strong regionalism or assimilationist nationalism. Identity pluralism leads 
to the paradoxical conclusion that we promote social unity by mitigating social unity: we 
downplay institutionally the importance of dominant shared identities, so different 
subidentities flourish more and create social unities across a variety of overlapping groups. 
These subidentities are still binary: for every identity of profession, gender, religion, etc., 
there are opposing identities and thus ‘others’ within the same categories. Yet because every 
individual has a different set of binary identities, groups overlap. Identity pluralism merely 
prevents the formation of a humanity divided deeply along the lines of one category such as 
religion, nationalism or regionalism. 
 In conclusion, identity pluralists reject Kymlicka’s self-government rights for national 
minorities. The idea of plural identities clashes with disregard for differences within groups 
and relations between groups; automatic prioritisation of national minority identity over 
others; cementing cultures and identities that are naturally fluid; worsened economic 
opportunities and disparities that foster identity singularisation; and the overall internally 
conforming and externally excluding influence of self-government based on a singular 
cultural identity. Instead, to promote the free flourishing of individuals’ different identities, 
states should grant national minorities participation rights. These rights allow their members 
to transcend their cultural identity, and balance and prioritise their identities within the larger 
society. Consequently, national minorities and polyethnic groups should receive similar 
participation rights, which are less demanding and controversial than self-government rights. 
This largely obviates the problematic distinction that Kymlicka makes between them and 
makes his liberal multiculturalism simpler and more easily applicable.  
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4 Conclusion 
 
Kymlicka’s main liberal multicultural argument, that a state cannot be completely neutral with 
regard to language, school curricula, public holidays and other necessarily arbitrary policies 
and should therefore accommodate minorities so that they can utilise their liberal freedoms 
equally as the majority, is convincing. However, even after slight modifications in recent 
books and a subtle shift of attention from justice to stability,
65
 the liberal multicultural theory 
he introduced in Multicultural Citizenship is still inadequate. Namely, it relies on a sharp 
distinction between different types of cultural groups that ignores the plurality of individual 
identity and undervalues the importance of political stability. Consequently, I have argued 
that the notion of identity pluralism, which predates Kymlicka’s work but was only recently 
introduced into liberal debates by Sen, supports liberal multiculturalism in general, but 
endorses only participatory individual rights for both polyethnic groups and national 
minorities. Identity pluralism supports multicultural rights, because they not only allow an 
individual to live according to her culture, but according to her multiple identities that all 
share certain cultural characteristics with different groups. Identity pluralists endorse 
participation rights for both polyethnic groups and national minorities, so that individuals can 
freely flourish in – and prioritise – their different identities, and transcend their dominant 
cultural identity more easily to broaden and balance their different identities within the larger 
society. Conversely, they reject Kymlicka’s self-government rights for national minorities, 
because these will likely – even if unintentionally – strengthen the dominance of cultural 
identity over individuals’ other identities. Such dominance both limits individuals’ awareness 
of their different identities in which they are free to flourish and heightens the risk of violence 
along the lines of singularised identity groups. It was beyond the scope of this article to 
address properly the effect of identity pluralism on Kymlicka’s additional category of 
representation rights, which he seems to suggest could apply to both polyethnic and national 
minority groups. However, a preliminary conclusion might be that democratic participation 
creates an awareness of citizens’ plural and interconnected identities and should be promoted 
through public funding for advocacy groups, more political party inclusion, proportional 
representation and veto powers for minorities. However, special representation rights that pre-
allocate legislative seats based on one particular identity category should be rejected.
66
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 The real-world ramifications of my theoretical conclusion would be significant. 
Identity pluralism would not mean that current minorities cannot receive multicultural rights, 
but that national minorities that enjoy or aspire to self-government rights should be denied 
these. Consequently, regions like Quebec, Flanders and Catalonia do not merit the level of 
autonomy they currently enjoy, and Scotland should not be granted independence from the 
United Kingdom. The conclusion also means that states should retract certain forms of 
autonomy that polyethnic groups currently exercise. For example, immigrant groups in Britain 
and the Netherlands should no longer receive government funding to operate their own 
(religious) schools, which exacerbate a social division along cultural-religious lines. 
Conversely, countries that do not grant (sufficient) participation rights should institute these. 
For example, public institutions such as schools and government workplaces in France should 
allow individuals to wear religious symbols and clothing, so that minorities can more easily 
transcend their religious group identity through more active participation in the larger French 
society.  
 Of course, these policy changes that identity pluralism leads to presuppose an 
adherence to liberal multiculturalism – they will not appeal to liberal egalitarians or cultural 
conservatives. In addition, Sen’s approach to stability through plural identities has not yet 
proven to be better than Kymlicka’s approach to stability through appeasing national 
minorities with self-government rights. More generally, identity pluralism supports 
participation rights and denies self-government rights in a modern state in which all other 
circumstances are equal. However, considerations of “equality”, “historical agreements” (and 
injustice), or the “value of diversity” may be more pressing in certain contexts than identity 
pluralism and political stability.
67
 Finally, the hypothetical implications of identity pluralism 
do not mean that in the real world there should be no exceptions or that current self-
government provisions should be reversed. Certain “isolationist ethnoreligious groups” such 
as the “Hutterites, Amish, or Hasidic Jews”, or indigenous peoples living away from 
modernity in countries like Australia and Brazil, which Kymlicka describes, might still have 
strong claims for self-government
68
 – even though these remain problematic cases from the 
identity pluralism perspective. In addition, the conclusion drawn from identity pluralism is 
perhaps not so alarming that regions such as Quebec that have already received substantial 
self-government rights should suddenly cede these. Rather, identity pluralism provides a new 
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perspective that implies caution in granting autonomy to a host of national minority groups 
that currently still live under regular governments around the world. It does not mean to 
elevate the status quo, but unless we are sure that granting self-government will improve 
stability or there is a “patent injustice”69 everyone agrees should be resolved perhaps we 
should maintain the current situation and offer minorities participation rights that promote 
flourishing plural identities and mitigate singular cultural divides. Kymlicka might be 
receptive to such a focus on participation rights, as he stresses the importance of individual 
liberal rights and the possible benefits of social integration for minorities.
70
 In addition, he 
advocates caution himself: he believes that multicultural rights should not be granted easily, 
but be subject to case-by-case evaluations of evidence and context-specific measures.
71
  
Kymlicka stresses that “[i]n many countries of the world – including the emerging 
democracies in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia – the status of national minorities and 
indigenous peoples is perhaps the most pressing issue”, and that these countries are looking to 
Western theorising for guidance.
72
 Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism strengthened 
by a consideration of Sen’s identity pluralism might provide policymakers with part of the 
normative answer to this issue. 
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